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Research and development (R&D) collaborations between an innovator and her partner are often undertaken
when neither party can bring the product to market individually, which precludes value creation without
a joint effort. Yet R&D’s uncertain nature complicates the monitoring of effort, and the resulting moral
hazard reduces a collaboration’s value. Either party can avoid this outcome by acquiring the capability that
is missing and then taking sole ownership of the project. That approach involves two types of risks: one
related to whether the other party’s capability will be acquired, and one to how well it will be implemented
(if acquired). We find that the extent of these two risks determines the optimality of delaying contracting
or of signing contracts with buyout and buyback options, a baseball arbitration clause, or a novel reciprocal
option. Baseball arbitration and reciprocal option clauses are unique in two ways. First, unlike typical options
with pre-determined strike prices, they allow either party to determine the buyout price at the time of their
offer. Second, they allow the offer’s recipient to “turn the tables” on the other party. Although baseball
arbitration and reciprocal option contracts both address inefficient joint development and product allocation,
they exhibit their own inefficiencies that stem from the two parties’ strategic behavior. The best choice of
contract is determined by trade-offs between these inefficiencies. Our model explores the similarities between
the baseball arbitration and reciprocal option clauses, and we propose a modification to the reciprocal option
contract that would increase its profitability.
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1. Introduction
Global biopharmaceutical sales surpassed $1 trillion in 2014; Pfizer’s sales alone accounted for
nearly $50 billion (Statista 2015). Because most drugs lose much of their economic allure once
patents expire and competition from generics brings prices down by as much as 90%, it is crucial for
biopharmaceutical firms to replenish their product pipelines with new candidates (Aitken 2016).
Recent trends show that more than half of all newly approved drugs involve partnerships
(Czerepak and Ryser 2008) and that partnered drugs are more likely to succeed (Markou et al.
2018). It follows that partnerships—which allow for the realization of synergies from complemen-
tary capabilities (Doz and Hamel 1998, Bhaskaran and Krishnan 2009, Crama et al. 2017) or the
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sharing of risk (Crama et al. 2008, Dechenaux et al. 2009, Bhattacharya et al. 2015) and alleviate
cash constraints (Lerner and Merges 1998)—play a critical role in the vitality of the biopharma-
ceutical industry. Another recent trend is that partnerships are increasingly being formed at earlier
stages in the research and development (R&D) cycle (Garcia 2008).
There are two sets of concerns related to partnerships that start at early stages of development.
First, they involve higher market and regulatory risks, which the parties aim to reduce through
their efforts. Moral hazard issues surface because the value created through the parties’ efforts
is shared. Second, early-stage alliances involve longer time frames that often exceed a decade
(Figueiredo et al. 2015). Over such long time horizons, firms’ capabilities are dynamic in the
sense that firms make conscious efforts to acquire new capabilities by widening their resource base
(Teece et al. 1997). The acquisition of a partner’s complementary capability makes a company
less dependent on the partner (Inkpen and Currall 2004), but it does not guarantee successful
implementation of that capability (Ranft and Lord 2002). Furthermore, whereas a firm’s acquisition
of a new capability may be observable to others (as in the case, e.g., of hiring key personnel,
undertaking a merger, or establishing new divisions), just how well that capability is implemented
is an internal matter and private information.
The first set of concerns has been modeled extensively by the literature on new product develop-
ment and technology licensing. We therefore start with a standard model of value creation efforts,
capturing moral hazard, and show how the results of those efforts can be mapped to more general
conditions of value. We place more emphasis on the second set of concerns. In particular, we explic-
itly model the efforts of each party to acquire the other’s distinctive capability, the uncertainty of
implementing an acquired capability, and the resulting asymmetric information structure—while
also accounting for the moral hazard due to value creation efforts.
To maintain a consistent terminology throughout the paper, we refer to the stakeholders as
follows. The party that owns the candidate product’s intellectual property (IP) rights before
a partnership agreement is the innovator (she), and the other party to the agreement is the
partner (he). These two parties engage in an early-stage partnership agreement. Their distinct and
complementary capabilities make development of the candidate product possible. Yet partnerships
also involve various costs due to agency issues, such as moral hazard (Bhattacharya et al. 2015,
Crama et al. 2017) and difficulties in coordination (Gulati and Singh 1998). Once one party’s
capability is acquired by the other party, the latter may benefit from avoiding the agency and
coordination costs inherent to joint development by executing the project on its own.
Taneri and Crama: Turning the Tables in R&D Licensing Contracts 3
Various contractual mechanisms enable either party to take the product in-house. We shall con-
sider contracts with (i) buyout–buyback options, (ii) a baseball arbitration clause, and (iii) an
innovative reciprocal option. The effectiveness of these contracts will be analyzed from the inno-
vator’s perspective. As a benchmark, we also model the innovator’s choice to delay contracting
until discovering whether she can acquire and how well she can implement her missing capability.
Options typically stipulate a strike price at which a party can exercise them (Dixit and Pindyck
1994). A buyout (resp. buyback) option allows the partner (resp. innovator) to buy out the inno-
vator (resp. partner) at that pre-specified strike price. When the option is exercised, the party that
was bought out is no longer involved in the project and so the product can be developed without
incurring agency costs. A dual buyout–buyback option combines these two options in a single con-
tract that allows either party to exercise the option in the event it acquires the other’s capability.
When an option and its associated strike price are not specified in the contract, each party can
still make an offer to buy out the other. However, the lack of an explicitly stated strike price may
lead to a dispute about the offered price and about who should take ownership of the project. Such
disputes are often resolved through arbitration, a process whereby a final and binding decision is
made by an impartial arbitrator with legal and industry expertise (WIPOSurvey 2013). Indeed,
the number of pharmaceutical disputes handled by the American Arbitration Association has been
steadily increasing, and this industry is the sixth-largest contributor to the London Court of Inter-
national Arbitration’s caseload (Parker and Reeves 2018). We focus on baseball arbitration,1 where
the arbitrator reviews a proposal and counterproposal by two parties and decides which of the two
shall prevail. We found baseball arbitration to be common in biopharmaceutical agreements, but its
novelty in the operations literature motivated us to provide several examples in the eCompanion.
A reciprocal option likewise allows either party to buy out the other but differs from common
buyout and buyback options in two important ways. First, like baseball arbitration, reciprocal
options do not specify a strike price; instead, the “offeror” (the party making the offer) determines
the strike price at the time of its offer. Second, such options allow the “offeree” (the party receiv-
ing the offer) to reciprocate and buy out the offeror at the offeror’s strike price. Before describing
the conditions under which these respective contracts are optimal, we next give examples of each:
buyback option, baseball arbitration, and reciprocal option.
An agreement between Biohaven Pharmaceutical Corp. and Royalty Pharma, signed in 2018,
included a buyback option for Biohaven that could be exercised at a pre-determined strike price.
1 So called because of its similarity with how baseball players’ salary disputes are resolved. In the 2019 Major League
Baseball season, for example, Nolan Arenado (third baseman for the Colorado Rockies) filed for arbitration while
proposing a salary of $30 million; the Rockies proposed $24 million (Perrotto 2019).
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The agreement stated that Biohaven could exercise its option “for a purchase price of One Hundred
Fifty-Five Million Dollars ($155,000,000) in cash (the ‘Buy-Back Price’).”
An agreement between Pfenex and Jazz Pharmaceuticals, entered in 2017, specified that dis-
putes may be resolved through baseball arbitration “conducted by one arbitrator who shall be
reasonably acceptable to the Parties ... [with] educational training and industry experience suf-
ficient to demonstrate a reasonable level of scientific, financial, medical and industry knowledge
relevant to the Dispute.” After investigating proposals by both parties, the arbitrator would select
one of those proposals and could not alter the terms or resolve the dispute in any other manner.
A 2008 agreement between AstraZeneca and MAP Pharmaceuticals had a similar baseball arbi-
tration clause under which the arbitrator would determine which of the two proposals “is the most
fair and reasonable to the Parties in light of the totality of the circumstances.”
In 2011, Array Biopharma, who held the IP rights to a cancer drug, entered into a licensing
agreement with ASLAN Pharmaceuticals. The agreement included a reciprocal option: either party
could trigger a buyout at any time before “the expiration or termination of the agreement.” It
stipulated that either “Party (the ‘Offeror’) may trigger a buy-out by providing to the other Party
(the ‘Offeree’), notice [that] set[s] forth a lump sum payment amount (the ‘Buy-Out Price’).”
Finally, the agreement stipulated that “the Offeree may elect, in its sole discretion ... to buy out
the Offeror ... for the same lump sum Buy-Out Price that was offered by the Offeror.”
The trend toward earlier-stage licenses implies that contracts will increasingly need to accom-
modate dynamic capabilities. We aim to answer the following questions. When (and how) can
innovators use an array of contracts to accommodate dynamic capabilities? What are the benefits
of mechanisms, such as baseball arbitration and reciprocal option clauses, that allow for turning
the tables on one’s partner? Can one improve the innovative reciprocal option contract and thereby
bring it into the mainstream?
We make several contributions to the literature. First, the R&D licensing literature has tradi-
tionally focused on other dynamics in multi-stage partnerships, such as technical and market risks
and moral hazard. We complement this literature by modeling the dynamic nature of capabilities
(in the form of efforts to acquire new capabilities) and the uncertainty about how well newly
acquired capabilities can be implemented. Second, we contribute to the licensing literature—which
has focused on the more common (buyout and buyback) option contracts—by modeling two mech-
anisms not considered in that research stream: the widely adopted baseball arbitration clause and
an innovative but underutilized reciprocal option. Third, on a prescriptive note, we demonstrate
how a minor modification of this reciprocal option contract (viz., adding a “buyout price floor”)
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substantially enhances its desirability. Our analysis reveals that managers should consider the
implications of dynamic capabilities when structuring contracts for early-stage partnerships. The
choice among contracts is driven by two factors: the cost or difficulty of obtaining a new capability,
and the uncertainty in how well it can be implemented.
2. Literature Review
Our paper builds on two research streams: the literature on dynamic capabilities and the literature
on R&D licensing. We review each of them in turn.
2.1. Dynamic Capabilities
Firms create unique value propositions by leveraging their physical, human, and organizational
resources. These resources determine a firm’s core competencies. Dynamic capabilities are orga-
nizational and strategic routines that managers use to alter their resource base (Eisenhardt and
Martin 2000). This change can be achieved through various mechanisms: the acquisition of new
resources, the increased integration of existing resources, and/or the shedding of resources no
longer seen as valuable (Teece et al. 1997). We are interested in the firm’s potential to gain new
capabilities and in their effect on how that firm structures its partnerships. Thus we focus on the
first of these mechanisms.
Firms can gain new resources through acquisitions. The literature has focused on pre- and
post-acquisition factors that result in successful implementation of the newly acquired resources.
Larsson and Finkelstein (1999) address pre-acquisition factors and find that cultural similarity
and consistency of vision, as well as production and marketing complementarities across the two
firms, are essential to the realization of potential synergies. Ranft and Lord (2002) suggest that
the level of communication with members of the acquired firm—and the level of autonomy granted
to them—determines the success of implementing the acquired firm’s knowledge.
Firms also gain new capabilities through alliance interactions. An alliance not only fulfills the
need for a missing capability but also allows the firm to understand that capability, after which
it can move on to learning about and acquiring other capabilities. Indeed, Powell et al. (1996)
find that firms forming alliances that allow them to learn about one capability subsequently form
other types of alliances. Inkpen and Currall (2004) remark that, as one party in the alliance learns
about and absorbs the other’s capability, the former becomes less dependent on the latter.
Biopharmaceutical firms have pursued both avenues of attaining new capabilities. Helfat et al.
(2009) report that Lilly has sought to expand its capabilities through alliances. In contrast, Glax-
oSmithKline, Sanofi-Aventis, and Pfizer have pursued acquisitions.
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Prior research has focused on how firms should or do acquire new capabilities. In contrast, we
explore the implications of dynamic capabilities for the structure of early-stage alliances. Hence
we do not distinguish between different means of acquiring a needed capability. Rather, we model
the probability that a firm acquires a new capability as a function of its endogenous effort while
accounting for the potentially less-than-seamless implementation of the acquired capability.
2.2. R&D Licensing
Most of the literature on R&D licensing is concerned with the use of various (typically financial)
contract terms to address agency problems that arise during interactions between two firms. Thus
that research addresses risk aversion, moral hazard, asymmetric information, and holdup prob-
lems. Jensen and Thursby (2001) study the use of equity and royalties to address moral hazard.
More recent papers study additional contract terms and also combine asymmetric information with
moral hazard (Crama et al. 2008, Xiao and Xu 2012, Savva and Taneri 2015). In their examination
of the holdup problem, Bhattacharya et al. (2015) account for the Risk preferences of two part-
ners. Empirical work has documented that biopharmaceutical partners structure their alliances to
address asymmetric information, holdup concerns, and risk aversion (Taneri and De Meyer 2017).
A new product candidate typically takes more than a decade to proceed, through development
stages, from idea to launch (Figueiredo et al. 2015). Such long development cycles across multiple
stages entail significant technical and market uncertainty. Hence the literature has explored differ-
ent avenues to introduce flexibility in contracting. Examples include the use of options, contract
timing within the R&D process, renegotiation, and whether to contract on actions or deliverables.
It is well known that options facilitate the evaluation of uncertain, multi-stage projects (see e.g.
Santiago and Vakili 2005). Various papers in the R&D licensing literature have studied the use of
different types of options. Savva and Scholtes (2014) compare licensing to co-development with and
without opt-out options in the presence of technical and commercial uncertainty. Bhattacharya
et al. (2015) assess the effectiveness of buyout options versus “milestone” contracts in addressing
moral hazard, risk aversion, and holdup problems. Crama et al. (2017) compare the effectiveness
of buyback, buyout, and two-way options with respect to different control rights and timing deci-
sions. Ziedonis (2007) finds empirical evidence that companies licensing university technologies are
more likely to sign option contracts when the focal project is more uncertain or the companies
are less able to evaluate the technology’s potential. In the biopharmaceutical sector, Lerner and
Malmendier (2010) study the use of termination options to address development uncertainty.
Several studies examine the impact of contract timing. Crama et al. (2017) find that it is optimal
to delay partnerships for incremental innovation with little market uncertainty yet to sign contracts
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at an earlier stage for other projects—provided that control rights and options are appropriately
assigned. Kalamas and Pinkus (2003) suggest that biopharmaceutical partnerships would be more
effective if formed earlier than current industry practice. Garcia (2008) documents a trend toward
earlier-stage licensing and notes the prominence of flexibility in such licensing agreements.
Some scholars explore how contract renegotiation allows the parties to respond to changes in
the environment. According to Xiao and Xu (2012), renegotiation improves contracting outcomes
by reallocating incentives to the party whose capability is most needed at a particular stage in the
project; however, it also exacerbates the problems associated with information asymmetry. Crama
et al. (2017) model costly renegotiation and find that it works similarly to delayed contracting for
incremental innovations with a low level of market uncertainty.
Finally, Ryall and Sampson (2017) argue that contract mechanisms should be tailored to the
underlying information structure. They find that it is best to contract on actions under full informa-
tion whereas, under asymmetric information (and especially when there is ambiguity), the parties
should prefer to contract on deliverables. Bhaskaran and Krishnan (2009) contrast contracting on
the sharing of actions (development/innovation effort) and the sharing of deliverables (revenue).
These authors establish that the choice between actions-based and deliverables-based contracts
depends on the ratio of the two parties’ effort costs and also on the project’s uncertainty.
These papers show the importance of contracting nuances and flexibility given the uncertainties
and information asymmetries inherent to the R&D process. A thread that runs through all the
works just cited is that the need for flexibility is driven by technical and market risk. Another com-
monality is that, regardless of who owns what capabilities (and a party may own two), the parties
do not acquire new capabilities. Yet the possibility of acquiring new capabilities is precisely the
focus of our paper. We are interested in dynamic capabilities because R&D partnerships are fre-
quently of long duration. As established in the literature on dynamic capabilities (see Section 2.1),
firms are continually acquiring new capabilities—especially firms in high-tech industries (Teece
2007), which are of particular relevance to this paper. We therefore discuss how to make con-
tracts more flexible in light of future, endogenous, and uncertain changes to the parties’ respective
capabilities and to their need for each other.
3. Model
This section is divided into three parts. First, we characterize capability acquisition efforts and
the two resulting uncertainties from those efforts. Second, we characterize value creation efforts
by either a single party developing the product in-house—contingent on that party’s capability
acquisition outcome—or two parties jointly developing the product. Third, we formulate and solve
the first-best capability acquisition efforts and allocation decisions of a central planner.
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3.1. Capability Acquisition Efforts
Our model consists of an innovator and a partner. The two parties bring different capabilities to the
table (e.g., drug development, design of clinical trials, expertise in a particular therapeutic area,
class of molecules, slow-release technologies). Either party can exert efforts to attain the capability
of the other after an agreement is signed. In the absence of an agreement, the innovator—who
owns the innovation’s IP rights—can attempt to attain her partner’s capability. The efforts of the
innovator and the partner are denoted by probabilities p and q, respectively. The cost of effort is
quadratic in the chosen effort: cp2/2 and cq2/2, where c > 0 represents the difficulty of acquiring
a new capability. Thus there is uncertainty about whether or not capability acquisition will be
successful, and higher effort levels increase the likelihood of success.
Yet even if one assumes that a party is successful in acquiring the other’s capability, the former
may not be able to implement that capability as well as the latter. So in addition to uncertainty
about whether acquisition efforts will translate into a new capability, there is also a second uncer-
tainty about its implementation. Our model represents the second uncertainty via the parameter
Γ∈ {γ,1}, where 0<γ < 1. When Γ = 1, the new capability has been acquired and implemented in
full; thus the acquiring party is just as effective as the other party. When Γ = γ, the new capability
has been acquired but not implemented in full; hence the acquiring party is not as effective as the
other party. We assign equal probabilities to the full and partial implementation of an acquired
capability. As a result, the coefficient of variation of the value that can be attained by a single party
who has acquired the other’s capability is 1−γ
1+γ
; a smaller γ implies greater uncertainty in value due
to implementation concerns. Hence we refer to the parameter γ as the implementation uncertainty.
3.2. Value Creation Efforts
The two parties have complementary capabilities that, together, enhance the project’s value.
We capture complementary capabilities through a Cobb–Douglas function of the form v(P,Q) =
AP 1/2Q1/2. The constant A is a measure of efficiency in converting efforts to value and is deter-
mined by how well each capability has been implemented by the party or parties exerting effort P
(resp. Q) in the innovator’s (resp. partner’s) original capability. Hence we adopt the form A =
(ΓPΓQ)
1/2. We assume that exerting effort P (resp. Q) has an associated quadratic cost of the
form kP
2
8
(resp. kQ
2
8
).2
So when one party has attained the other’s capability and then plans to exert effort P and
effort Q, its optimization problem is given by maxP,Q≥0 V2(P,Q,Γ) =
√
ΓPQ− kP2
8
− kQ2
8
, where
2Our results are generalizable to any A(ΓP ,ΓQ)> 0 that is increasing in Γi (i∈ {P,Q}) and to any form of convex
costs kP ρ/κ and kQρ/κ with ρ > 1, k > 0, and κ> 0.
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Γ represents how well that party has implemented its new capability.3 The optimal efforts by that
party are given by P ∗ =Q∗ = 2
√
Γ
k
, and it earns
V2(P
∗,Q∗,Γ) =
Γ
k
. (1)
Equation (1) shows that value creation efforts depend on the capability acquisition outcome,
which in turn depends on capability acquisition efforts. When the newly acquired capability is
implemented in full (Γ = 1), value creation efforts generate a value of V2(P ∗,Q∗,1) = 1k . When
implemented partially (Γ = γ), those efforts generate V2(P ∗,Q∗, γ) = γk = γV2(P
∗,Q∗,1)< 1
k
.
When both parties bring the product to market jointly, however, each capability is implemented
in full (by the party exerting the effort) and the product’s value is given by
√
PQ. It is straight-
forward to show that the value created is highest when the two parties split that value equally.4
An equal split is consistent with practice: among all agreements in the Thomson Reuters Recap
Database that include a profit-sharing clause, nearly two thirds of them divide the profit equally.
In that case, the innovator and her partner simultaneously solve the respective optimization prob-
lems maxP≥0 V1(P,Q) = 12
√
PQ− kP2
8
and maxQ≥0 V1(P,Q) = 12
√
PQ− kQ2
8
. The optimal efforts
are then P ∗ =Q∗ = 1
k
, and each party earns V1(P ∗,Q∗) = 38k for a total value of
2V1(P
∗,Q∗) =
6
8k
. (2)
We can draw two conclusions from equations (1) and (2). First, a party that has attained
the other’s capability—and has implemented it in full—always creates more value than the two
parties jointly developing the product: 1
k
> 6
8k
. This outcome reflects the presence of moral hazard
concerns when the two parties work together and the absence of those concerns when both efforts
are made by a single party that has fully implemented its new capability. Second, a party that
has attained the other’s capability but has only implemented it partially may create either more
or less value than the two parties jointly developing the product; whether or not γ
k
> 6
8k
depends
on the value of γ. Thus we compare losses from partial implementation of a new capability to the
losses due to moral hazard. The relative magnitudes of these losses will determine whether more
value is created when the two parties collaborate on value creation or when one party, who has
only partially implemented its new capability, makes both efforts.
A more general representation of our model’s salient features abstracts from the Cobb—Douglas
function by defining the value attained by a single party that has implemented its new capability
3Here the subscript to Γ is omitted because we always have Γ = 1 for the party’s original capability.
4Documentation for these results is available from the authors upon request.
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in full (resp. partially) as V2 (resp. γV2). We denote the value attained by each party when they
jointly develop the product as V1 for a total value of 2V1, where 2V1 < V2. All subsequent results
using V1 and V2 can thus be interpreted by substituting V2 = 1k and V1 =
3
8k
. The notation for all
models is summarized in Table 1.
Decisions Parameters
p Capability acquisition effort by innovator c Capability acquisition effort cost factor
q Capability acquisition effort by partner k Value creation effort cost factor
P Value creation effort in innovator’s original capability Γ Capability acquisition outcome, Γ∈ {γ,1}, 0< γ < 1
Q Value creation effort in partner’s original capability V1 Value each party obtains from joint development
B Exercise/strike price V2 Value of product developed by a single party with Γ = 1
Table 1 Notation used in models
3.3. Central Planner’s Perspective
We assume that the central planner sets the capability acquisition efforts but not the value cre-
ation efforts. The reason is that our primary interest lies in investigating the optimal capability
acquisition efforts. If the central planner sets the value creation efforts then there would be no
moral hazard. In that case, neither would there be any incentive to incur capability acquisition
costs; hence capability acquisition efforts would (trivially) be set to zero.
Anticipating the potential results of the value creation stage, the central planner maximizes
social welfare by setting the socially optimal (first-best) capability acquisition effort levels for the
two parties and then determining the party (or parties) to which the product is allocated once the
effort outcomes are realized. We can therefore write the central planner’s objective function as
max
0≤p,q≤1
(
3
4
pq+
1
2
(p(1− q) + q(1− p))
)
V2 +
(
pq
4
+
1
2
(p(1− q) + q(1− p))
)
max{γV2,2V1}
+ (1− p)(1− q)2V1− cp
2
2
− cq
2
2
. (3)
The first term captures the case when at least one party has acquired the other’s capability
in full. The second term captures the case when (a) at least one party has acquired the other’s
capability but (b) neither party has acquired the other’s capability in full. In this case, the “max”
operator accounts for the central planner’s allocation decision by allocating the product according
to whether the product is more valuable in the hands of a single party or two parties. If γV2 > 2V1
then the product is allocated to a single party (which has acquired the other’s capability with
Γ = γ); otherwise, the product is brought to market by both parties jointly and the total value
is 2V1. The third term captures the case when neither party has acquired the other’s capability,
and the last two terms are (respectively) the innovator’s and partner’s effort costs.
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Figure 1 Central planner’s execution: First-best effort levels
Proposition 1. A central planner sets asymmetric efforts, with only one party exerting full
effort whenever (1− γ)V2 ≤ 4c≤ V2(1 + 3γ)− 8V1. Otherwise, the central planner sets symmetric
efforts p= q = 1 whenever 4c≤min{(1− γ)V2, V2 − 2V1} and p= q < 1 whenever 4c >max{V2 −
2V1, V2(1 + 3γ)− 8V1}.
All proofs are given in the eCompanion. Proposition 1 indicates that, despite both parties being
symmetric in their parameters at the outset, it may be socially optimal to induce asymmetric effort
levels. A graphical representation of the conditions in Proposition 1 is provided by Figure 1.5
We first note that, for low effort cost, the central planner sets both efforts to p∗ = q∗ = 1 and
then allocates the product to the party or parties creating the most value. This approach yields
an inexpensive hedge against the possibility of a low γ. As the cost of effort increases, such high
efforts can be justified only by higher implementation uncertainty (i.e., lower γ).
Now suppose that acquiring the capability is difficult (i.e., c is high). Then the quadratic nature
of effort costs implies that a marginal unit of effort is less costly when effort is low; as a consequence,
splitting effort across two parties reduces overall costs. Therefore, if c is high then the central
planner reduces individual effort to p∗ = q∗ < 1 and “spreads” effort without severely reducing the
likelihood of at least one party attaining both capabilities. In effect, if c is high then a different type
of hedge—namely, against neither party obtaining the other’s capability—also becomes important.
It is interesting that there exists a region—with moderate effort cost c and low implementation
uncertainty (high γ)—where the central planner sets asymmetric efforts. In that region, the cost
is not low enough to justify setting the effort of both parties to p= q = 1, especially since imple-
mentation uncertainty is low. Yet the high γ also makes it desirable for the product not to be
5All figures use the same parameters: V1 = 1 and V2 = 4.
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launched by the two parties together because 2V1 <γV2. Thus the need to ensure that at least one
party acquires the other’s capability induces the central planner to set the effort of one party (say,
the innovator) to 1. A nonzero effort is set for the other party to hedge against the Γ = γ outcome.
In other words, the central planner aims to achieve two types of hedge: (i) a failure hedge against
neither party obtaining the other’s capability; and (ii) an implementation hedge against uncertainty
in the implementation outcome. If γ is high then the failure hedge is more critical and so, for a
wider range of effort cost, the central planner sets at least one party’s efforts to the maximum.
When γ is low, the implementation hedge is crucial; hence effort is spread evenly between both
parties to increase the likelihood that at least one of them achieves full implementation. In this
case, if c is low then the probability of success is set to 1 for both parties (p= q= 1); for higher c,
that probability is set to a value lower than 1 (p= q < 1) and decreases as c increases.
Our analysis of the central planner’s problem hints at the key tensions an innovator faces when
selecting among and optimizing the parameters of various contracts. The first trade-off concerns
the allocation decision: make it too easy to take development in-house, and the less capable party
may end up with the product; make it too difficult, and risk ending up with joint development—
and the associated moral hazard loss—even if more value would have been created by a single
party. The second trade-off is with regard to capability acquisition efforts: a contract that induces
too little effort does not provide a sufficient hedge against failure and partial implementation, and
one that induces too much effort destroys value by incurring too much cost relative to the value
of the hedge it provides.
4. Innovator’s Contract Choices
In this section, we investigate the various contracts and compare the value they generate for the
innovator. We start with the case of delayed contracting. Then we explore the following contract
structures: a dual buyout–buyback option, baseball arbitration, and reciprocal option. Figure 2
plots the timelines and illustrates the two parties’ interaction under the different contract types.
If no contract is signed upfront at time t= 0, then only the innovator exerts capability acquisition
effort (p) at time t = 1. Once the result of this effort is revealed at t = 2, the innovator decides
whether (or not) to contract with a partner at time t= 3. Payoffs are realized at t= 4. Alternatively,
the innovator and partner sign a contract at time t= 0. This contract specifies the type of contract
signed, the side payment F from the partner to the innovator, and—in the case of a dual-option
contract—the option exercise price B. At time t = 1, the two parties decide on their respective
effort levels p and q. The outcome of these efforts is realized at t= 2. We assume that each party can
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Figure 2 Timelines under different contract structures
observe whether the other has obtained a new capability but cannot observe how well it has been
implemented. Hence, there is asymmetric information about implementation. These circumstances
are akin to, for example, knowing that a company acquired a small biotech with specific capabilities
but not knowing how well the physical and human assets of that biotech have been integrated into
the acquiring firm. At time t= 3, the parties make a decision about whether or not to continue
with joint development. With a dual buyout–buyback option, either party can choose to exercise
the option at the pre-determined strike price B. If both parties want to exercise the option, then
whichever party makes the offer first (with probability 1/2) buys out the other. With baseball
arbitration, either party can propose a price BR to buy out the other party. The party that makes
a proposal first becomes the proposer, and the other party (the proposee) can either choose to
accept that proposal or go to arbitration with a counterproposal to buy out the proposer for BE.
The arbitrator decides which proposal prevails. Under a reciprocal option contract, either party
can make an offer B whose value was not pre-specified. The party that makes an offer first becomes
the offeror, and the other party (the offeree) decides whether to accept the offer or to reciprocate
(i.e., to buy out the offeror at the same price B). Payoffs are realized at t= 4.
4.1. No Upfront Contract
With no upfront contract, the innovator makes an individual effort upfront and contracts with a
partner only if needed, after her effort outcome is realized. Then the innovator’s optimization is
max
0≤p≤1,0≤F≤V1
1
2
pV2 +
1
2
pmax{γV2, V1 +F}+ (1− p)(V1 +F )− cp
2
2
.
The innovator’s optimal actions are described in Lemma 1.
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Lemma 1. With no upfront contract, the innovator’s optimal effort level is pN = 1 for c ≤
V2+max{γV2,2V1}−4V1
2
and is pN < 1 otherwise. The innovator always sets F = V1 and contracts with
the partner only when (a) she achieves partial implementation and γ ≤ V2
2V1
or (b) she fails to
acquire the partner’s capability.
Since the innovator contracts with the partner only if ΓV2 ≤ V1 + F , it follows that setting
the fixed fee to its upper bound (or F = V1) maintains the socially optimal product allocation
decision—namely, that the partners develop jointly if γV2 ≤ 2V1 or if she fails to acquire the
missing complementary capability. Despite being able to induce the socially optimal allocation, the
innovator’s effort decision differs from the central planner’s effort decisions described previously;
hence the innovator (weakly) overinvests in effort because she is alone in exerting effort and so
cannot benefit from either an implementation hedge or a failure hedge.6
4.2. Dual Buyout–Buyback Option
It can be shown that, in our setting, a single buyout or buyback option where only one party has
the right to buy out the other is dominated by a dual buyout–buyback option where either party
can buy out the other.7 Hence we model the dual buyout–buyback option as the first alternative
to not signing an upfront contract. With this option, the partner has the right to buy out the
innovator and the innovator has the right to buy back rights to the product from the partner at
a pre-determined price B. The contract structure is optimized by solving the game via backward
induction. In the first of three steps, the partners decide whether or not to exercise their respective
options. We remark that the option will never be exercised if V2 − B < V1; thus we limit our
analysis to the case where B <V2−V1. To describe the remaining cases, we introduce an indicator
function d∈ {0,1} such that
d=
{
1 if γV2−B >V1,
0 if γV2−B ≤ V1.
When d= 1 the option is exercised by a party who has attained either Γ = γ or Γ = 1, whereas
when d= 0 the option is not exercised unless a party has attained Γ = 1. If neither party exercises
their option then the product is developed jointly. If only one party wants to exercise its option,
the exercising party takes sole ownership of the product. If both parties want to exercise their
option, then the exercise order is assigned randomly.
6When F = V1, the partner receives zero utility from the contract. Therefore, if the innovator cannot set the highest
admissible fixed fee then further value could be lost as compared with the social optimum, since the allocation
decision will be suboptimal whenever 2V1 > γV2 >V1 +F .
7Results from comparing single and dual buyout–buyback options are available from the authors upon request.
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In the second step, the innovator and partner—while accounting for their own and the other
party’s anticipated exercise decisions—optimize their efforts so as to maximize their value. Because
the parties’ objective functions are symmetric, we present only the innovator’s. Formally, we write
max
0≤p≤1
pq
(
d
(
1
2
((γV2−B)/2 + B/2) +
1
2
((V2−B)/2 + B/2)
)
+ (1− d)
(
1
4
V1 +
1
4
B+
1
4
(V2−B) + 1
4
((V2−B)/2 + B/2)
))
+ p(1− q)(d((V2−B)/2 + γV2−B/2) + (1− d)((V2−B)/2 + V1/2))
+ (1− p)q(dB+ (1− d)(B/2 + V1/2))+ (1− p)(1− q)V1− cp2
2
. (4)
The first two lines capture the case when both parties attain the other’s capability. In this case,
if d= 1 then the parties exercise their option regardless of their implementation outcome. If the
innovator has only partially implemented her newly acquired capability (with probability 1/2)
then her payoff is γV2 −B when she is first to make the offer or B when the partner makes the
first offer (here each party is equally likely to make the first offer). Under full implementation, the
payoffs are V2−B and B, respectively. If d= 0 then one of four combinations of events can occur,
each with probability 1/4. No offer is made if both parties attain only partial implementation,
leading to payoff V1. If one party has achieved full implementation but the other has not, then
the former’s payoff is B and the latter’s is V2 − B. If both parties attain full implementation,
either party could be the first to make an offer with equal probability: the first mover and second
mover obtain V2 −B and B, respectively. The third line of the objective function captures the
case when only the innovator has attained the capability of the partner in a similar fashion. On
the fourth line, the first term captures the case when only the partner has attained the capability
of the innovator, the second term captures the case when neither party has attained the other’s
capability, and the last term captures the innovator’s effort cost.
Let pO(B) and qO(B) denote (respectively) the innovator’s and partner’s optimal effort as a
function of B. Then, in the third step, the strike price B is set to maximize social welfare—the
sum of the payoffs of the innovator and the partner—as seen here:
max
B≥0
pO(B)qO(B)
(
d
(
γV2
2
+
V2
2
)
+ (1− d)
(
2V1
4
+
V2
4
+
V2
4
+
V2
4
))
+
(
pO(B)(1− qO(B)) + qO(B)(1− pO(B))
)(
d
(
V2
2
+
γV2
2
)
+ (1− d)
(
V1
2
+
V2
2
))
+ (1− pO(B))(1− qO(B))2V1− cpO(B)
2
2
− cqO(B)
2
2
.
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The social welfare function follows the same structure as equation (4). Note that the strike price B
cancels out in the social welfare function because it is simply a transfer from one party to the
other. Having created the maximum social welfare, there will always exist a side payment that can
satisfy the participation constraints of both parties provided that more value is created than under
the case with no upfront contract. The outcome of this optimization is summarized in Lemma 2.
Lemma 2. With a dual buyout–buyback option, it is optimal to set a low strike price of
B =
(1 + γ)V2
4
− c((1 + γ)V2− 4V1)
2((1 + γ)V2− 4V1 + 2c) ≤ γV2−V1
if γ ≥ γ1 and c < c1 or if γ ≥ γ2 and c > c1. Otherwise, it is optimal to set a high strike price of
B = max
{
γV2−V1 + ε, V2
2
− 2c(V2− 2V1)
V2− 2V1 + 4c
}
.
Lemma 2 shows that it may be optimal to set the strike price B at one of two levels. Note
that all boundaries (γ1, γ2, c1) are defined in the proof. When the strike price is high, only a party
that attains Γ = 1 exercises the option. This means that if each party has acquired the other’s
capability, but only one with full implementation, then a high strike price allows for the product to
be allocated to the party that can create the most value. When the strike price is low, the option
can be exercised by any party that attains the other’s capability regardless of implementation
outcome (i.e., the option is exercised for Γ = γ and Γ = 1). It follows that, if each party has
acquired the other’s capability but with different implementation outcomes, a low strike price does
not necessarily allocate the product to the party best able to create the most value.
Proposition 2. The dual buyout–buyback option strictly dominates not signing a contract
upfront if and only if c > (1+γ)V2
2
− 2V1 or γ ≤ γ3.
Proposition 2 shows that a dual buyout–buyback option often—though not always—outperforms
delayed contracting. The dual buyout–buyback contract induces efforts from both parties; that
is not possible with delayed contracting, where only the innovator exerts effort. As illustrated
earlier, inducing both parties to exert effort yields an implementation and/or failure hedge. When
implementation uncertainty is high (i.e., γ is low), simultaneous efforts allow the selection of the
better of two capability acquisition outcomes. When the cost of effort is high, simultaneous efforts
can also reduce that cost by lowering the individual effort level needed to achieve the same overall
probability of success—or to improve the overall probability of success at the same total cost. Any
additional value created by such hedges can be split across the parties through side payments,
which is why the innovator prefers the dual buyout–buyback contract to delayed contracting.
Taneri and Crama: Turning the Tables in R&D Licensing Contracts 17
Figure 3 Optimal contracting choice with a dual option
Figure 3 also distinguishes between regions where it is optimal to charge a high versus a low
strike price (B). The choice between a low and a high strike price depends on trade-offs between
the severity of the two contracts’ distinct downsides, as we now explain.
With a high strike price, it could be that the option is not exercised even when at least one
party acquires the other’s capability. This happens in two scenarios: (i) when both parties have
attained Γ = γ; and (ii) when one has attained Γ = γ but the other has failed to acquire the new
capability. In both scenarios, the parties’ payoffs are {V1, V1} for a total of 2V1 (excluding side
payments). When 2V1 < γV2 (i.e., γ is high), some value is lost. In addition, the higher γ is, the
more value is lost if a high strike price prohibits a party with Γ = γ from exercising the option. This
issue does not arise when 2V1 ≥ γV2 (i.e., γ is low) because the parties then prefer a payoff of V1
each. Therefore, a high strike price is preferred when γ is low. With a low strike price, it could
be that the option is exercised—and the product is developed by—the less capable party. That
happens with probability 1/2 when one party attains Γ = γ and the other Γ = 1. Then both parties
wish to exercise their respective options, and the party who has partially implemented the new
capability might act first. Although that outcome is always suboptimal, this is less of an issue when
γ is high—in which case a low strike price is preferable. Our comparison demonstrates the first
trade-off mentioned at the end of Section 3.3. An innovator, when restricted to traditional option
contracts with a pre-determined strike price, chooses the less detrimental of two downsides: joint
development when more value would have been created by a single party (when the strike price is
high) versus the less capable party taking development in-house (when the strike price is low).
Finally, we observe from Figure 3 that it may still be optimal for the innovator not to sign an
upfront contract under medium to low c and high γ. There are two reasons for this result. First, the
innovator always acquires the other party’s capability in this region because the combination of a
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relatively low c and a high γ induces the optimal effort p= 1, which eliminates the need to induce
partner effort as a hedge against failure. Second, a hedge against implementation uncertainty (the
Γ = γ outcome), which a partner’s effort would provide, is less valuable when γ is high.
4.3. Baseball Arbitration
In the absence of a pre-determined strike price, either party may propose to buy out the other. The
recipient of the proposal can choose to accept it. If the recipient is not satisfied with the proposal,
then baseball arbitration clauses provide a framework for the recipient to make a counterproposal,
after which both proposals are submitted to an arbitrator. We solve this contract structure by
backward induction, starting with the decision of the arbitrator, followed by the determination
regarding the proposal vs. the counterproposal, and finally the effort level selection by both parties.
For brevity, we omit the detailed formulations.
Making the Proposal and Determining the Price. We label the first party to make a
proposal the proposer (R) and the recipient of that proposal the proposee (E). The proposee can
either accept the proposal, BR, or approach a domain expert arbitrator with a counterproposal to
buy out the proposer at a price, BE >BR. The arbitrator’s decision on which of the two proposals
prevails is final. The arbitration process has a cost 0 < α < V2−γV2
2
for each party.8 We make
the following assumptions about the arbitrator. First, the arbitrator observes Γ for each party.
Second, the arbitrator chooses the proposal that attains a cooperative outcome by minimizing the
maximum dissatisfaction of the two parties (see e.g. Barron 2013). Third, when the two parties’
levels of dissatisfaction are equal, the arbitrator chooses the higher proposal. The dissatisfaction
of a party whose proposal is not chosen by the arbitrator is given by the difference between the
payoff they would have attained with their proposal and the payoff they attain with the chosen
proposal— that is, by DR = (ΓRV2−BR)−BE and DE = (ΓEV2−BE)−BR for the proposer and
the proposee, respectively.
Lemma 3. It is optimal for a proposer who has attained ΓR = 1 to propose BR = V2−α
2
+ε, where
ε→ 0+. This proposal is accepted by proposees of either type. For a proposer who has attained
ΓR = γ, it is optimal to propose any BR ∈ (γV2−α
2
, V2−α
2
)
. This proposal is accepted by proposees of
type ΓE = γ but not by those of type ΓE = 1. A proposee for whom ΓE = 1 goes to arbitration with
a counterproposal BE =BR + δ, where δ→ 0+ and the arbitrator decides in favor of the proposee’s
counterproposal.
8 The condition α < (V2− γV2)/2 ensures that the total cost of arbitration, 2α, is less than the value created
when the arbitrator allocates the project to a party who attained Γ = 1 instead of to a party who attained Γ = γ.
Otherwise, arbitration would destroy value.
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Lemma 3 implies that a proposer that has fully implemented its new capability makes a proposal
that would be accepted by a party who has attained full or partial implementation. Once accepted,
this proposal would allow the proposer to attain a payoff of V2+α
2
−ε. It is interesting that, because
the proposee wants to avoid arbitration costs, the existence of a costly arbitration process allows
the proposer not only to make a lower proposal but also to attain a payoff that exceeds half of
the project’s value. This excess payoff increases with the arbitration cost. A proposer who has
partially implemented a new capability makes a proposal that would be accepted by a party who
has attained partial implementation but is taken to arbitration by a party who has attained full
implementation, for whom the benefits of owning the project in its entirety outweigh the arbitration
costs.
Proposition 3. When each party has acquired the other’s capability, the optimal proposal
strategies are as follows.
1. If 3γV2 ≤ V2 + 4V1: An offer is made whenever Γ = 1 but no offer is made otherwise.
2. If 3γV2 >V2 + 4V1: An offer is made whenever Γ = 1; however, if Γ = γ then the parties play
a mixed strategy whereby an offer is made with probability pi= V2(3γ−1)−4V1
2γV2−4V1 .
Proposition 3 shows that a party who achieves full implementation always makes a proposal.
That is because being the first mover in this case allows the successful party to achieve a payoff of
V2+α
2
, which is strictly greater than half of the value created. Yet when a party achieves only partial
implementation of the other party’s capability, the former may prefer not to make a proposal if
the value with partial implementation is low. The reason is that the excess return above half of
the value created (γV2+α
2
) in case the proposal is accepted is not enough to compensate for (a) the
possibility of a counterproposal and its associated lower payoff and (b) the missed opportunity
of receiving a better proposal in the event that the other party has attained full implementation.
When the value with partial implementation is large enough, what emerges is a mixed strategy
that balances the benefits and costs mentioned here. When only one party achieves the other’s
capability, the former exploits that circumstance to make a proposal BR = 0 because the latter,
unsuccessful party cannot further the project on its own.
Choosing the Effort Level. In this step, the two parties choose their effort level to maximize
their respective payoffs while taking into account their own and the other party’s subsequent
proposal and counterproposal behavior as well as the other party’s anticipated best-response effort
level. We illustrate the innovator’s payoff function here for the three possible cases of γ:
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Figure 4 Optimal contracting choice with dual option and baseball arbitration (α= V2(1− γ)/4)
ωIA =
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pq
4
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pq
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)
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2
V1 +
1
2
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)
+ (1− p)q 1
2
V1 + (1− p)(1− q)V1− cp22 if γV2 <V1.
The objective function includes the payoff when both are successful—playing either a mixed
strategy (γV2 ≥ V2+4V13 ) or a pure strategy (γV2 < V2+4V13 )—followed by the payoffs when the
innovator is successful yet the partner is not, then the payoff where the partner is successful but the
innovator is not (which is null when γV2 ≥ V1), and finally the payoff when neither is successful. The
last term is the cost of effort. The two parties optimize their efforts to maximize their payoff. We
use their response functions to find the equilibrium efforts (pA, qA), which are given in Lemma 4.
Lemma 4. Under a baseball arbitration contract, the optimal efforts are as follows.
1. If γV2 > V2+4V13 , then pA = qA = min
{
1, 16(γV2−2V1)((1+γ)V2−2V1)
64V1(V1−c)−8(V1(1+7γ)−4cγV2+(1+γ(2+13γ))V 22 −4α(4V1+V2(1−3γ))
}
.
2. If V1 <γV2 < V2+4V13 , then pA = qA = min
{
1, 4((1+γ)V2−2V1)
(1+4γ)V2−10V1+8c
}
.
3. If γV2 <V1, then pA = qA = min
{
1, 4(V2−V1)
V2−2V1+8c
}
.
We can now proceed to compare the contract value under baseball arbitration to the contracting
choices studied previously. The results are summarized in Proposition 4.
Proposition 4. Baseball arbitration is equivalent to the dual-option contract for c ≤ V2−2V1
4
and γ ≤min{V2+4V1
3V2
, γ3
}
. Baseball arbitration is strictly better than all other contract forms for
γ ≥ V2+4V1
3V2
and c≤ (1−γ)V2(8V1+V2(1−5γ))−4α(4V1+V2(1−3γ)
8(γV2−2V1) .
Proposition 4 and Figure 4 illustrate that using a baseball arbitration clause is optimal when c
is low and γ is high; furthermore, it is equivalent to using a dual-option contract for lower values of
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γ and low cost. The equivalence of these two contracts is intuitive in light of the parties’ proposal
and effort behaviors. For lower γ, the optimal proposal strategy under baseball arbitration is the
pure strategy in which a party with partial implementation does not make a proposal yet a party
with full implementation does. In general, the penalty for failure to acquire the missing capability
is high under baseball arbitration (i.e., a payoff of zero or at best V1)—leading to overinvestment
in capability acquisition efforts relative to first best. However, overinvestment is not a concern if
the cost of effort is sufficiently low—that is, when exerting maximum effort is first best. Given
that the same effort and offer behavior are observed under baseball arbitration and dual-option
contracts, they lead to identical levels of social welfare. The baseball arbitration contract is strictly
superior to the dual-option and no–upfront contracting choices for high γ and low c. Baseball
arbitration contracts perform better than dual option contracts with a high strike price because
the mixed strategy that arises under partial implementation means that—unlike the case of a
dual-option contract—there is a nonzero probability that some proposal will be made when both
parties achieve only partial implementation and the project will then be taken forward by one
party only. Baseball arbitration can outperform the no–upfront contract alternative because it
induces both parties to exert effort; hence baseball arbitration yields an implementation hedge
that is unavailable if a contract is not signed upfront. One disadvantage of baseball arbitration
is overinvestment relative to socially optimal capability acquisition efforts, which destroys more
value when c is high. Thus the second trade-off described at the end of Section 3.3 moves the
innovator away from baseball arbitration when c is high: the cost of capability acquisition efforts
is greater than the benefits from a hedge against failure and implementation uncertainties.
4.4. Reciprocal Option
Recall that the reciprocal option has two distinguishing characteristics: the option’s strike price
is not set ex ante, instead being stipulated at the time of offer; and the recipient of the offer
can reciprocate it—that is, buy out the offering party at the offered strike price. This contract
structure, too, is solved via backward induction.
Making the Offer and Determining the Price. The decision in the first step includes both
whether (or not) to make an offer and at what price. Note that the offer decision is a simultaneous-
move game. If both parties decide to make an offer, we randomly assign who moves first.
First, we study the case in which only one party is successful at acquiring the other’s capability.
In this case, it is easy to show that the successful party should make an offer with a strike price
of B = 0—safe in the knowledge that the other party cannot reciprocate.
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However, if both parties are successful then the agents will be strategic about whether or not to
make an offer; the reason is that being in a position to reciprocate an offer is preferable to making
an offer. The decision to offer and the amount of the offer are separable decisions. The strike price
is set with reference to the offeror’s anticipation of the offeree’s reaction and does not depend on
the former’s own implementation level. If the offer’s recipient is indifferent between accepting it
or not, then we assume that it is accepted. The decision on whether or not to make an offer is the
outcome of a strategic game that is summarized in Proposition 5.
Proposition 5. If each party has acquired the other’s capability, then the optimal offer strike
price is B = γV2/2 and the optimal offer strategies are as follows.
1. If γV2 ≤ 2V1: An offer is made whenever Γ = 1 and no offer is made otherwise.
2. If γV2 > 2V1: An offer is made whenever Γ = γ; however, if Γ = 1 then the parties play a
mixed strategy whereby an offer is made with probability pi= γV2−2V1
V2−2V1 .
In case 1, the mechanics of the reciprocal option contract prevent product allocation to a single
party if only partial implementation has been achieved; they also ensure that the product is not
developed jointly if full implementation has been achieved by at least one party. In case 2, the
two parties may end up developing jointly—despite each having achieved full implementation—
because both parties would prefer to be the offeree (which would allow them to reciprocate and
thus appropriate more value) than the offeror. Yet if both parties have attained full implementation
and opted not to make an offer, then each is left with a payoff of V1. This amount is strictly less
than the strike price (B = γV2/2) and is also strictly less than the product value minus the strike
price (V2− γV2/2), which are the respective amounts garnered by an offeror and an offeree. Thus
both parties, irrespective of their roles in the process, would be better off had an offer been made.
The reluctance to make an offer is driven by the difference in revenue for offeror and offeree and
so it declines as that difference decreases (i.e., as γ increases), per Proposition 5.
Choosing the Effort Level. In this step, the two parties choose their effort level to maximize
their value while taking into account both the “offer game” they will be playing next and the
other party’s anticipated best-response effort level. We characterize the parties’ respective efforts
in Lemma 5.
Lemma 5. Under a reciprocal option contract, the optimal efforts are as follows.
1. If γV2 > 2V1, then pR = qR = min
{
1, 4(V2−2V1)((1+γ)V2−2V1)
(2+γ(1+γ))V 22 −2(5+3γ)V2V1+16V 21 −8c(V2−2V1)
}
.
2. If V1 <γV2 < 2V1, then pR = qR = min
{
1, 4((1+γ)V2−2V1)
(1+4γ)V2−10V1+8c
}
.
3. If γV2 <V1, then pR = qR = min
{
1, 4(V2−V1)
V2−2V1+8c
}
.
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Figure 5 Optimal contracting choice with dual option, baseball arbitration, and reciprocal option
Proposition 6 gives the condition for which the reciprocal option contract is optimal.
Proposition 6. The reciprocal option contract is equivalent to the baseball arbitration and dual-
option contracts for c ≤ V2−2V1
4
and γ ≤ 2V1
V2
. The reciprocal option contract dominates the other
contract forms when γ ≥ γ4 and c≤ (1−γ)(γV2−2V1)V22(V2−2V1) .
Proposition 6 and Figure 5 illustrate that the innovator may prefer to use the reciprocal option
when c is low and γ is either high or low (but not when γ takes intermediate values). If γ is
low—and so the optimal action for the two parties under a reciprocal option contract is the pure
strategy described in Proposition 5—then the reciprocal option, baseball arbitration, and the dual
buyout–buyback with a high strike price are equivalent. All of these contracts induce maximum
effort and, in each case, only a party that has implemented its new capability in full makes an offer
or proposal that is accepted or exercises its option. We remark that these are the same effort levels
and product allocation outcomes as when the central planner decides. Thus these three contracts
achieve maximum social welfare when γ is low.
The advantages of the reciprocal option over not signing an upfront contract or signing a dual
option contract are similar to the advantages of baseball arbitration (see the discussion in Sec-
tion 4.3). If γ is high, and so the optimal action for the two parties is the mixed strategy described
in Proposition 5, then the reciprocal option’s two main disadvantages are minimized. One disad-
vantage of the reciprocal option contract is that, when only one party has acquired the other’s
capability (which is observable), the newly capable party can buy out the other at a strike price
of zero. The possibility of this zero strike price is a severe penalty in the event of failure, and results
in overinvestment relative to socially optimal efforts.9 However, this problem is not an issue when
9 This result contrasts with the holdup problem, where an agent’s concerns about not being rewarded later—for an
investment made today—leads to underinvestment. In our case, a similar concern leads to overinvestment because
higher investment reduces the probability of no later reward.
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the cost of effort is low because socially optimal efforts are p= q= 1 to begin with. The reciprocal
option’s second disadvantage is due to the parties’ strategic behavior when Γ = 1. If both parties
have achieved full implementation yet choose to refrain from making an offer, then they are left
with a total payoff of 2V1. This amount is strictly less than V2, which could have been earned by
developing the product alone. Because the likelihood of not making an offer is decreasing in γ, this
problem is minimized when γ is high. Therefore, the reciprocal option outperforms other contracts
only in the high-γ area of Figure 5.
4.5. Reciprocal Option with a Price Floor
The relatively small region of optimality for the reciprocal option just described led us to explore
whether one can improve on this innovative contract and thereby bring it into the mainstream.
We pointed out that a major downside of the reciprocal option contract was that parties wary of
receiving a zero offer will tend to overinvest in capability acquisition efforts. This tendency limits
the reciprocal option’s applicability to the low–effort cost region, where overinvestment is not an
issue. We propose a simple modification that remedies this problem: a nonnegative lower bound s
on the strike price to be set by the innovator when the contract is signed. A clear implication of
this added degree of freedom is that the innovator cannot be worse off under this contract than
under the reciprocal option without a price floor; after all, the innovator can still set the price
floor to zero. Hence the question is whether this modification could lead to wider adoption of the
reciprocal option contract. Once again, we solve the game using backward induction.
Making the Offer and Determining the Price. To ensure that the price floor is less than the
strike price of the offer made when both parties are successful in acquiring the missing capability,
we require that s ≤ γV2/2. This inequality implies that there is no change in the offer behavior
when both parties are successful in acquiring the missing capability (see Proposition 5). If only one
of the parties has acquired their previously missing capability, then that party makes an offer of s
when ΓV2−s > V1. Thus an offer is always made when a newly acquired capability is implemented
in full (Γ = 1) but not necessarily when it is partially implemented (Γ = γ).
Choosing the Effort Level. In this step, the parties choose their effort level to maximize their
value. When doing so, they account for the other party’s anticipated best response and strate-
gic behavior. Lemma 6 shows how efforts depend on the price floor, which is then optimized in
Lemma 7.
Lemma 6. Under a reciprocal option contract with a price floor, the optimal efforts are:
1. if γV2 > 2V1, then pR = qR = min
{
1, 4(V2−2V1)((1+γ)V2−2(s+V1))
16V 21 −2(5+3γ)V1V2+(2+γ+γ2)V 22 +8c(V2−2V1)
}
;
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2. if V1 <γV2 < 2V1 and s < γV2−V1, then pR = qR = min
{
1, 4(1+γ)V2−8(s+V1)
8c+(1+4γ)V2−10V1
}
;
3. otherwise, pR = qR = min
{
1, 4(V2−V1+s)
V2−2V1+8c
}
.
Setting the Price Floor for Symmetric Efforts. The price floor is set to optimize total value
while respecting the proviso that it should be lower than the strike price of the reciprocal option
(s≤ γV2/2).
Lemma 7. The optimal price floor for a reciprocal option is:
1. If γV2 > 2V1:
(a) If c≥ (2+γ(1+γ))V 22 +16V 21 −2(5+3γ)V1V2
8(V2−2V1) : s= min
{
γV2
2
, (1+γ)V2
4
+ 4c((1+γ)V2−4V1)(V2−2V1)
32(c−2V1)V1+8((5+3γ)V1−2c)V2−4(2+γ+γ2)V 22 )
}
(b) If c < (2+γ(1+γ))V
2
2 +16V
2
1 −2(5+3γ)V1V2
8(V2−2V1) : s= min
{
γV2
2
,
(1−γ)γV 22 +2(1+γ)V1V2−8V 21
4(V2−2V1)
}
2. If V1 <γV2 ≤ 2V1: s= γV22
3. If γV2 ≤ V1: s= γV22
The numerical results plotted in Figure 6 illustrate that the reciprocal option contract is now
optimal in the region where γ and c are both high, where it can displace the dual-option contract
with low strike price. Hence a lower bound on the strike price that can be offered eases each party’s
concern about being left empty-handed (should their efforts fail) and so allows them to reduce their
efforts, bringing them closer to socially optimal levels. This outcome makes the reciprocal option
with a price floor effective when c is high, or when excess efforts are more costly. In addition, the
contract’s reciprocity feature enables a better implementation hedge than does the dual-option
contract with a low strike price. When one party has attained Γ = γ and the other Γ = 1, the
dual-option contract with a low strike price has an even chance of resulting in the party with Γ = γ
making the first offer and developing the product on its own. This allocation outcome, which is
clearly suboptimal, would not occur under the reciprocal option contract. The reason is that, if
Figure 6 Optimal contracting choice with dual option, baseball arbitration, and reciprocal option with price floor
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the party with Γ = γ made a buyout offer, then the party with Γ = 1 would reciprocate—leaving
the product in the hands of the more capable party. The trade-offs between the reciprocal option
contract and the dual option contract with a high strike price remain the same as those described
in Section 4.4. As a result, the former remains optimal in the high-γ region and the latter in the
low-γ region.
4.6. Benefits of Mechanisms to Turn the Tables
We set out to identify which contractual forms could best accommodate dynamics in R&D alliances
that arise because of the parties’ efforts to attain new capabilities that reduce their interdepen-
dence. We found that two characteristics of traditional option contracts render them too static
in the presence of dynamic capabilities: they specify a fixed strike price ex ante; and allocation
is final when the option is exercised. In contrast, mechanisms to turn the tables—both baseball
arbitration and reciprocal option contracts—offer two unique features: the flexibility to determine
the price ex post and reallocation after a proposal or offer is made.
The value of the flexibility feature is observed in comparison with the dual buyout–buyback
option with a high strike price. The high strike price makes it unprofitable for a party that only
partially implements the other party’s capability to exercise the option. If the best capability
acquisition outcome is partial implementation and if the product would be more valuable in the
hands of a single party, then inefficient joint development results. By not binding the offeror to
a pre-determined strike price, both baseball arbitration and the reciprocal option contract enable
parties to make buyout offers that vary as a function of their respective capability acquisition
outcomes. Thus the flexibility feature attenuates the inefficient joint development outcome.
The reallocation feature’s value is observed in comparison with the dual buyout–buyback option
with a low strike price. A low strike price makes it profitable for a party who only partially imple-
ments the other party’s capability to exercise the option even if the other party has implemented
their acquired capability in full. When this occurs, the product ends up in the hands of the less
capable party, leading to inefficient product allocation. Should an offer be made by a less capable
party, both baseball arbitration and the reciprocal option contract make it possible for a more
capable party receiving the offer to turn the tables and take the product in-house. Thus the real-
location feature attenuates the inefficient product allocation outcome. In effect, the reallocation
feature acts as an information revelation mechanism, alleviating asymmetric information: a party
that counterproposes or reciprocates must have implemented its newly acquired capability in full.
In sum, mechanisms to turn the tables incorporate flexibility and reallocation features that com-
pensate for the two drawbacks of the dual buyout–buyback contract: inefficient joint development
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(when the strike price is high) and inefficient product allocation (when the strike price is low).
Provided that these improvements outweigh the downsides due to strategic behavior under the
baseball arbitration or reciprocal option contracts, mechanisms to turn the tables are beneficial.
5. Conclusions and Managerial Implications
The biopharmaceutical industry has witnessed a trend toward earlier-stage alliances. Long lead
times to market mean that each party’s capabilities will likely change during the course of an
alliance. Although complementary capabilities are a chief driver of collaboration, either party that
acquires the other’s capability is in a position to bring the product to market on its own—with
the benefits of avoiding agency and monitoring costs.
We have therefore explicitly modeled the efforts of each party to acquire the other’s capability
as well as their efforts to create value. Dynamic capabilities engender two types of uncertainties:
about whether either party will, in fact, acquire the other’s capability; and about how well a newly
acquired capability will be implemented. We assessed the effectiveness of different contracts in
this context. In particular, we surveyed dual option, baseball arbitration, and reciprocal option
contracts and compared them to a benchmark of no upfront contracting. In different contexts,
option contracts are known to enable better responses to the resolution of various uncertainties.
Baseball arbitration and reciprocal option contracts are interesting yet understudied mechanisms
that are employed in practice and could improve the response of firms to uncertainties. We focus
on these latter two contract types because they share two relevant features: such contracts (i) allow
either party to specify the price at which they offer to buy out the other party at the time of the
offer, rather than when the contract is signed; and (ii) give the party receiving that offer the right
to turn the tables and buy out the party that made the initial offer.
We found that the value of each contract depends on the difficulty of acquiring the other party’s
capability and also on the uncertainty associated with how well that capability will be imple-
mented. Table 2 maps these two factors onto recommended contracts. The optimal contract aims
to balance effort costs, uncertainties about capability acquisition and implementation, and inher-
ent contractual inefficiencies. The relative importance of these concerns varies with the contracting
environment. Not signing a contract upfront allows a party to avoid agency and monitoring costs,
but efforts from both parties serve as a hedge against the uncertainties of capability acquisition
and implementation.
Whenever implementation uncertainty is high, hedging against it naturally gains in significance
and so contracting becomes more attractive. The dual option contract with a high strike price
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Table 2 Innovator’s Optimal Contract Choice
performs best regardless of how difficult it is to attain the other party’s capability. The high strike
price ensures that the option is exercised only with full implementation; otherwise, the parties
continue jointly. This outcome is efficient when the value under partial implementation is low
(i.e., implementation uncertainty is high). Note that in the lower left corner of Table 2, where
implementation uncertainty is high and the difficulty of acquiring the other party’s capability is
low, we have shown different contract structures to be equivalent. Nevertheless, we display the
dual option contract with a high strike price because it involves one less step—once a buyout is
triggered—and so is easier to implement.
If implementation uncertainty is low and if capability acquisition is less costly, then it makes
sense for both parties to invest in acquiring their missing capability despite the lower value of
the implementation hedge. Under these circumstances, baseball arbitration and reciprocal option
contracts outperform a dual option contract with high strike price because of their better allo-
cation, and no upfront contracting because of their implementation hedge. We also observe that
inefficiencies resulting from the two forms of strategic behavior—no offer by either party and a
zero offer by one party—are minimal or eliminated in this region. Which of baseball arbitration
or reciprocal option contracts prevails depends on the relative value loss due to the first form
of strategic behavior. Under baseball arbitration, this occurs for parties who have only partially
implemented the other’s capability. Hence the loss is of lower magnitude for higher implementation
uncertainty, in which case baseball arbitration is preferred. Under a reciprocal option, strategic
behavior is exhibited by parties who have fully implemented the other party’s capability. Such
behavior occurs less frequently if the implementation uncertainty is low. Hence there is less of a
loss when implementation is less uncertain, and a reciprocal option is preferred.
As effort costs increase, a contract that induces both parties to invest heavily in capability
acquisition is no longer beneficial. Yet a social planner would still be justified in encouraging
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just one party to incur a high acquisition cost—especially when implementation uncertainty (and
hence the benefit from an implementation hedge) is low. It follows that an innovator in these
circumstance should refrain from signing an upfront contract but, at the same time, should work
hard to acquire her missing capability.
Finally, as it becomes even more difficult to acquire the other party’s capability, the innovator’s
high effort in the absence of upfront contracting becomes too costly; then contracting is preferred
for its ability to create, at reasonable cost, a hedge against both capability acquisition uncertainty
and implementation uncertainty. Here the reciprocal option with a price floor is preferred because
it maintains allocation efficiency and also, thanks to the price floor, prevents overinvestment from
the parties that the second form of strategic behavior (i.e., a zero offer) would have induced.
Our analysis also allowed us to uncover exactly why baseball arbitration and the innovative
reciprocal option work. Although the dual option contract likewise allows both parties to exercise
the option, one must bear in mind the advantages of contracts that enable parties to turn the
tables. First, the flexibility of setting the buyout price ex post allows a party to make a buyout
offer at a strike price that reflects the capability acquisition outcomes. This feature alleviates the
inefficient joint development problem, which is a drawback of the dual option contract with a
high strike price. Second, the reallocation feature ensures that a more capable party will always
reciprocate a less capable party’s offer; this alleviates the inefficient allocation outcome, which is
a drawback of the dual option contract with a low strike price. It is this capacity to address both
of these inefficiencies that render mechanisms to turn the tables valuable in settings where their
own (unique) drawbacks are minimal.
It is important to compare our findings to observations from practice. The model presented
here indicates that standard option contracts are optimal over a large range of parameters, which
is consistent with their wide adoption in practice. Our model shows also that there are limited
circumstances under which the reciprocal option should be preferred over other contracts; this
finding is consistent with the observation that reciprocal option contracts are seldom used in
practice. Nevertheless, we offer a modification to that contract—adding a price floor—that would
minimize its downsides and make it much more attractive. In this sense, our results are also
prescriptive.
The region where baseball arbitration should be preferred is similarly limited in our model.
This result is at odds with the widespread use of baseball arbitration clauses in biopharmaceutical
agreements. We believe there are several reasons for the discrepancy. First, we model only disputes
related to one party’s intention to buy out the other, yet baseball arbitration clauses apply to a
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broader set of disputes. For example, the agreement between Cydex and Spectrum Pharmaceuticals
(detailed in the eCompanion) states that “any and all disputes or controversies arising out of or
relating to this Agreement shall be exclusively and finally resolved by binding arbitration ... on the
basis of ‘baseball arbitration’ principles”. Second, arbitration proceedings and arbitral awards are
confidential, a feature that many firms find attractive (Bennett 2002, Boyd 2003). Third, because
of provisions in the United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign
Arbitral Awards, such awards are easier to enforce internationally than are court judgments. In
light of our findings and other research into litigation (Ryall and Sampson 2017), future work
could well consider comparing the use of litigation to that of arbitration.
Our paper contributes to the literature in a number of ways. First, we introduce a model that
explicitly accounts for efforts by parties to attain missing capabilities. Second, we examine baseball
arbitration and reciprocal option contracts which are novel to the R&D licensing literature. Third,
the relatively limited circumstances under which the reciprocal option is beneficial prompted us to
modify it in a way that would substantially increase its applicability. By introducing and setting
an optimal lower bound on the exercise price that the two parties can offer each other, we enable
the innovator to mitigate the overinvestment problem that arises without such a lower bound.
Incorporating this modification substantially increases the applicability of the reciprocal option
contract. We focus on improving the reciprocal option—rather than baseball arbitration—contract
for two reasons: (i) the practitioners we interviewed stressed that the reciprocal option contract
seems to “automate” the baseball arbitration process common in biopharmaceutical R&D licenses;
and (ii) arbitration is both time-consuming and costly. It follows that a well-designed reciprocal
option contract has the potential to reduce the need for arbitration while maintaining its benefits.
These insights provide guidance to managers about how, in the face of dynamic capabilities, they
should structure and execute contracts for early-stage partnerships.
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